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This paper seeks to analyze a decade of international development in Kenya 
through the lens of a multi-sited and multi-level ethnographic analysis. It 
demonstrates the inherently messy andpolitical nature of development as well as 
the need to analyze the social and cultural contexts in which policies are debated, 
negotiated, and implemented An anthropological pproach provides insight into 
the complexity of development policy and the unpredictability ofdevelopment 
outcomes which are obscured by research that relies on policy texts and/or 
eschews empiricalfieldwork. 
OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES there has been a massive outpouring of research 
on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in international development. Initial 
work in the early 1980s tended to accept claims regarding their efficacy in 
alleviating poverty and/or hunger in the Third World.' In the late 1980s empirical 
research began to document the diversity of organizational types found among 
NGOs, indicating considerable variability in their forms, functions, and activities. 
In East Africa, for instance, immense operational and philosophical differences 
are found between local-level, national, and international NGOs.2 Research also 
began to look at the constraints faced by NGOs in their day-to-day operations, 
which in turn led to an appreciation of the wider policy environments in which 
they operated and an attempt to identify an "enabling" environment conducive for 
NGO operations.3 Finally, research found that a distinction between "the state" 
and NGOs obscured key overlaps. For example, a nation-state may create and fund 
NGOs, and NGOs often recruit government personnel and rely on government 
funding. An understanding of this inter-relationship allows a much clearer grasp 
of the emergence of clearly observable tensions and conflicts between NGOs and 
the state, particularly in the context of the rapid growth of NGOs (Bratton 1989). 
Somewhat curiously, while researchers have debated the concept and the 
possibility of "participation" in development,4 a term that lies at the heart of NGO 
claims, ethnographers have not examined the participatory claims of NGOs or 
of NGO projects (Botchway 2001; Mosse 2005a; Porter, Allen, and Thompson 
1991). Even so, it is clear that the meaning and possibility of "participation" 
varies greatly over time, by place, and between countries and projects. 
In retrospect it would appear that a great deal of our knowledge about the 
Journal ofAnthropological Research, vol. 64, 2008 
Copyright ?D by The University of New Mexico 
249 
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.022 on September 17, 2019 03:46:26 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
250 JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
process and politics of international development, and especially about the work 
of different development institutions, is of variable quality owing to the fact that 
many of those who write about development adopt a normative approach. For 
instance, many writers fail to critically examine the reality behind NGO rhetoric. 
Thus, in the 1980s, writers championed NGOs, which were, it was argued, better 
positioned to "do" development than the state. Subsequently, many now argue 
that NGOs are "democratic actors" involved in pursuing democratic hange 
and widening citizen participation (Mercer 2002). In effect, such claims reflect 
an uncritical acceptance of representations bydevelopment organizations that 
development is "a set of self-evident universals, a common sense abstracted 
and autonomous from actual relations, having a logic of its own (that of market 
relations) and subject to policy levers acting on behavior through institutional 
rules and incentives" (Mosse 2005b:27). In short, they assume that the system of 
aid is rational and coherent and that development institutions such as NGOs can 
be understood as rational actors. 
A second problem confronting research on international development arises 
when findings from research on a particular NGO and/or project are generalized 
to other contexts and/or organizations. A great deal of development research is 
based on data collected in brief visits to a small number of organizations that 
operate in unique locales. A further problem arises from research that eschews 
empirical fieldwork, preferring analysis of policy documents (e.g., Abrahamsen 
1997; Escobar and Alvarez 1995; Ferguson 1990). Research on development 
encounters significant problems given the need to grapple with the issue of 
scale, the problem of grasping activities at different sites, and the difficulty of 
analyzing myriad organizations whose professed intentions are often at odds with 
organizational outcomes. 
Recently anthropologists have begun to focus on aspects of fluidity, resource 
flows, and transnational links to analyze NGO projects (Mosse 2005a). Indeed, 
development policy and practice are ideal subjects for pursuing multi-sited 
ethnography in an attempt to understand policy implementation, capture "people's 
understandings of shifting cultural milieus," and analyze the interconnections 
among beneficiaries, grassroots NGOs, intermediary NGOs, and donors 
(Markowitz 2001; Mosse 2005a). 
In this paper I pursue a multi-sited ethnography to analyze an area of 
development policy and practice that is poorly understood and little researched, 
namely the political field constituted by the relations among foreign aid agencies, 
a host government, and a diverse range of NGOs. In particular I examine the way 
in which development policy in Kenya unfolded in the 1990s (Figure 1). This 
paper has three objectives. First I seek to differentiate between the rhetoric and 
reality exhibited by NGO projects/programs during the 1990s. Second I examine 
the political relations among NGOs, the Kenyan government, and foreign aid 
agencies. Finally I reinterpret the donor development discourse-in other words, 
development as a strategic partnership to reduce poverty-that obscures the 
highly charged political relationship that exists with the Kenyan government. 
I need first to acknowledge my position in the web of relations this paper 
describes. Having already worked for nearly 6 years in East Africa (including 
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1 '/2 years setting up an NGO), I first went to Kenya in 1994 as a development 
consultant hired by the UK Department for International Development (UK 
DFID). I joined a large World Bank Poverty Assessment of Kenya, and my brief 
was to examine the perspectives and approaches taken by NGOs to reduce poverty 
(Campbell 1994). I returned in 1998, again as a DFID consultant, to assess the 
potential contribution of Kenyan civil society organizations to reduce poverty; this 
gave me an opportunity to assess the NGO sector, visit projects, and interview 
bilateral aid agencies. I returned in 1999 to evaluate one of DFID's flagship NGO 
projects, whose principal objective was to create social capital in coastal Kenya. 
Later in 1999 I returned to take part in an evaluation of DFID's entire funding 
scheme for NGOs, known as the Direct Funding Initiative. I draw on these various 
engagements, based as they are on a mix of participant observation, interviews, 
documentary analysis, project visits, and project evaluation, to show how the NGO 
field is structured by various tensions, notably around funding. It should be clear 
that none of the information cited here was provided in confidence; although DFID 
initially embargoed my reports, I was subsequently given permission to publish. 
The next section outlines the policy and political environment in Kenya during 
the 1 990s, including the shifting focus of bilateral support for NGOs. The next 
section assesses the poverty-related work of NGOs in 1994, and the following 
section assesses development in the late 1 990s, which ended in a failed attempt 
by foreign aid agencies to enroll key officials in a new development "partnership" 
called the National Poverty Eradication Plan. The paper concludes by revisiting 
the contribution of ethnographic research in producing a more informed and 
empirically rich account of the politically messy character of development policy 
and practice. 
THE POLICY AND POLITICAL CONTEXT IN KENYA 
The policy environment was overshadowed by the corrupt administration of 
President Arap Moi, who came to power in 1978 at the head of the ruling Kenya 
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African National Union (KANU) party. The party was riven by factions linking 
members of parliament to a variety of social and ethnic groups. The internal crisis 
within KANU, together with pressure from Kenya's donors, resulted in multi-party 
elections in 1992 and 1997. Political corruption was the concern of international 
donors who sought to monitor political developments and to exercise a degree of 
control over the regime by withholding/withdrawing aid and by funding NGOs. 
In 1981 the government adopted neoliberal economic policies linked to 
decentralization (through the District Focus for Rural Development, DFRD) and 
the adoption of structural adjustment programs (e.g., market liberalization and 
divestiture of public enterprises). Donor pressure also resulted in the adoption of 
a clearer poverty focus and of anticorruption measures, though little progress was 
realized. Notably, the DFRD gave rise to a "dual system" allowing the central 
state to control ocal development, which stymied local development initiatives 
and starved rural areas of finance (Schall 1998). Donors responded by bypassing 
the state and funding NGOs directly; assistance to NGOs was provided with the 
intention of offsetting criticism about structural adjustment and in line with donor 
efforts to reform the state and the public sector (Kanyinga 1993). 
By the mid-i 990s the political situation became tense as Moi targeted 
individuals and organizations that opposed him, subjecting them to growing 
harassment, intimidation, and violence. For example, the offices ofNGOs involved 
in rights-based campaigning were burned, and staff were arrested and intimidated. 
At about the same time, Moi engineered violence in areas dominated by his 
political opponents (including "ethnic clashes" in the Rift Valley area; Southall 
1999). Moi also evicted tens of thousands of "squatters" from government-owned 
land in order to reward his supporters.5 
Professed attempts by donors to curb the excesses of the Moi regime were, 
in the early half of the decade, largely restricted to reducing bilateral funding to 
the Kenya government. They cut existing funding in the (vain) hope of putting 
pressure on the state. These efforts coincided with a broader shift in international 
development policy, specifically the adoption of a commitment to "governance" 
and "human rights" (van Gastel and Nuijten 2006). However, such policies 
did not significantly alter the deeply entrenched bureaucratic modalities that 
bilateral agencies used to disburse aid. For instance, the conservative focus of 
British aid was reinforced by the decentralization of aid decisions to the regional 
office in Nairobi (at the time it was the headquarters for Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda).6 British aid was characterized by bilateral support to government 
ministries-little support was given to NGOs unless they were subcontracted to 
a government project. 
During the 1990s many bilateral agencies were reorganized (owing to 
rising public debt in Canada, changing Congressional priorities in the US, or 
policy reviews carried out by new governments, such as in the UK and The 
Netherlands).7 Furthermore, the level of foreign aid declined substantially (the 
major exceptions being Denmark, The Netherlands, and Japan) at a time when 
agencies were embracing wider policy objectives (i.e., poverty reduction and 
promoting democracy and good governance). There is little evidence to support the 
effectiveness of bilateral aid at this time.8 Indeed the Organization for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development notes that growing policy objectives, including a 
greater emphasis on integrating foreign policy and overseas aid, was not coupled 
with a genuine dialogue with recipient governments. This conclusion is amply 
supported by events in Kenya. 
There are four reasons why bilateral agencies provided limited funding to 
NGOs in Kenya. First, bilateral aid programs are top-heavy bureaucracies whose 
operational procedures favor the dispersal of large amounts of money; their 
procedures effectively exclude small NGOs who do not have the administrative 
capacity to complete lengthy application forms or comply with numerous 
reporting requirements. Indeed, most bilateral agencies fund NGOs from their 
own country or organizations that they "create."9 Second, bilateral agencies 
possess a myopic and limited understanding of Kenya and its development 
needs; frequently, political considerations take precedence over the provision 
of development assistance.'0 Third, decision-making in bilateral agencies is 
complicated by internal disagreements and debates. For example, in the British 
aid program tensions developed between its Social Development and Governance 
divisions, which undermined the development of a coherent NGO program, and 
there were managerial concerns that NGO funding would "fragment" he bilateral 
aid program. Donor funding generally, and especially with regard to the NGO 
sector, sought to achieve a degree of leverage over the Kenyan state, but such an 
objective was undermined by limited cooperation until the late 1990s." 
Regardless of the strategies pursued by bilateral agencies, the Kenyan 
govemment's poor implementation f neoliberal policies and anticorruption 
reforms was a constant concern to donors. In early 1994 the World Bank sent 
a mission to Kenya to monitor the government's progress. As a member of this 
mission I was tasked with understanding the "institutional factors" involved in 
poverty alleviation and service delivery from the perspective of NGOs. 
POVERTY AND NGO PROGRAMS IN 1994 
The ideology of self-help and "participation" has a long history in Kenya. In 
the postcolonial period, harambee (a "self-help" program initiated in 1963) 
linked thousands of communities directly to the state, forming a vehicle for 
the mobilization of support for local development and a means for KANU to 
dispense patronage (Holmquist 1984; Kanyinga 1993). Development (maendeleo) 
has been the responsibility of the Office of the President since independence; 
however, under President Moi very little funding was given to local communities 
(Udvardy 1990). By the late 1980s the absence of government funding for local 
development together with the impact of structural adjustment and liberalization 
defined the context for the adoption of "participation"-in which local people 
assume responsiblity for developing their community-as the modality for 
development. In this context the hope was that NGOs would serve as conduits 
linking communities to the state and to donors 
Donors had their own reasons for promoting participation; for example, it 
was seen as way of bypassing a "corrupt" state. Thus "shifts in donor policy and 
practice have, equally, brought participation into the mainstream, both through 
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an emphasis on the use of participatory methods within the context of the project 
cycle and commitment to civil society participation in determining development 
directions" (Cornwall, Musyoki, and Pratt 2001: 1). Critically, rather than opening 
up a dialogue with local people as a step in defining and meeting local needs, 
donors have instead used the mantra of "participation" to push their agendas. The 
net effect has been to shift the burden of development costs onto local people 
and away from the state, and to limit participation to instrumental forms of 
"consultation" (i.e., one-off meetings to generate a plan and/or review a project). 
The involvement of "foreign" NGOs in development began during the 
colonial period with the Christian churches. By the late 1970s there were about 
120 foreign and local NGOs. As of 1988 Kanyinga had identified 135 foreign 
NGOs (most of which had operational programs and provided limited assistance 
to local organizations) and 149 local NGOs (1993:64). It was estimated that these 
organizations had a combined annual budget of US$150-200 million, which 
represented 30-40% of development expenditure (Table 1; Kanyinga 1993:67). 
In 1991, and as a consequence of the money coming into this sector, the Kenyan 
government introduced greater regulatory control. In response the National 
Council of NGOs was formed as a means of negotiating with the government. By 
1994 about 400 NGOs were registered with the government, while another 100 
organizations waited to be registered. By 1998 the number of registered NGOs 
had risen to 1,028 (Table 2). 
Table 1 necessarily simplifies the diversity that exists across the sector and 
with respect to individual NGOs; individual organizations tend to pursue a range of 
projects as and when they obtain funding. Little accurate information exists about 
the operations of NGOs. International 
NGOs (INGOs), though small in number, 
dominate work in development, relief, 
and "technical" (e.g., water, appropriate 
technology) areas. In 1994 INGOs were 
primarily concerned with running their 
own programs; a few of them were 
funding a small number of local NGO 
"partners." In 1994 this relationship was 
mirrored in the work of existing NGO 
TABLE 2 
The NGO sector in 1998 in Kenya 
Sector % 
Natural resources 14 
Education 6 
Youth/family 4 
Water 3 
Social services 13 
Livelihoods 11 
Population and health 14 
Pastoralism 6 
Microfinance 4 
Urban 3 
Culture/religion 8 
Human rights 8 
Emergency 6 
Data provided by NGO Council 
TABLE 1 
The NGO sector in Kenya in 1988 
Sector % 
Relief and welfare 24 
Development 32 
Technical services 25 
Environment 5 
Other 14 
Source: Kanyinga 1993:67 
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organizations, each of which pursued a specific issue: (a) the NGO Council sought 
to address the effect of government policies on NGOs (notably concerns about 
registration a d accountability but also the problems created by ethnic lashes); 
(b) the INGO Coordinating Committee monitored economic issues (e.g., the 
effect of the currency devaluation and Value Added Tax on operational budgets); 
and (c) other fora-the Pastoralist Steering Committee, the Shelter Forum, etc. 
exchanged information a d/or lobbied on specific issues. 
NGOs varied greatly in their understanding of and approach to poverty 
reduction. Given space limitations, a few examples will have to suffice. The 
"technical" NGOs-those concerned with appropriate technology and enterprise 
creation-subscribed to a market-driven focus wherein individuals who possessed 
sufficient capital could apply for support and credit to expand their existing 
enterprises. These organizations clearly did not see it as their task to assist the 
poor; they rationalized their programs in terms of creating jobs in existing small 
enterprises.12 Thus, as the director of one organization stated, "The poorest are 
those who have no commercial background, have failed to earn a living, and who 
are primarily interested in finding secure employment. Such people are not [our] 
target group."'3 
A somewhat different view was articulated by a local NGO which began as a 
relief organization and which used food aid to improve primary school attendance 
and child nutrition. A project official from Kenya Freedom From Hunger linked 
the international metric of weight for height to "community" criteria to define the 
vulnerable as families "with no father (i.e., headed by a widow), large household 
size, few or no cattle, and families who withdrew from communal activities 
because they could not afford to participate." 
This view was expressed by educated, urban-based project staff and was 
shaped partly by funding constraints. Their implicit paternalism is shaped partly 
by the project's reliance on food aid and (possibly self-selected) community 
health workers whose view of poverty was defined solely in terms of whether a 
household had "malnourished" children. Health workers at a project in Embu told 
me that poor households were those that contained malnourished children; had 
few possessions and clothes; had poorly built homes (poor people slept on the 
dirt floor of their house); and whose children were unable to attend school and 
ate inadequate food. On this basis they estimated that between 25% and 33% of 
households were "poor." However, my discussion with health workers revealed 
that the principal cause of poverty arose from the pressure that population growth 
placed on existing land, and the fact that households allowed all their children 
(sons and daughters) to inherit land. In short, the fragmentation of land holdings 
was resulting in households having access to significantly less productive land. 
Poverty caused by structural factors such as population growth will not, however, 
be reduced by food aid. 
The work of the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK), Kenya's 
largest NGO, provides an interesting contrast. According to the director of 
NCCK's urban programs, the poor are those who are unable to meet their 
basic health and food needs. However, as with many organizations, assistance 
is not provided directly to individuals but rather to selected households and the 
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community via a small-group-loan scheme, a model pioneered in South Asia. The 
Women in Stress project in a Nairobi slum represented a different vision in which 
poor, uneducated, and unmarried women responsible for young children were 
provided counseling (and perhaps limited credit). The emphasis in this project 
was to stabilize the family situation of the women so they could earn income to 
support heir families. However, the complex problems confronting poor urban 
women were not amenable to easy solutions, and the lack of tangible outcomes 
failed to attract donor funding. Staff articulated a distinctive view of the problem: 
poor people, they said, have no hope or vision for the future. It was first necessary 
to restore self-belief and a hope for a better future by helping individuals to help 
themselves (a process in which external aid could only assist by funding more 
and better counseling). NCCK's emphasis was to provide material assistance to 
communities/individuals via group loans and to counsel destitute women. 
A contrasting view was articulated by the director of Oxfam-UK,'4 who 
recognized that Oxfam had serious problems in reaching the poor because of its 
history (it began by supporting the Catholic missions) and because it did not have 
a strategy to identify or work with the poorest. In 1994 Oxfam sought to overcome 
these problems by using Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA; Chambers 1994) to 
transform its work with pastoralists from emergency relief into a development 
project (see below). This contrasts sharply with many NGOs and aid programs, 
which find it easier to work with locally organized "self-help" groups or with 
individuals who are believed to be especially "vulnerable." The problem of 
assisting self-help groups is that they are the culmination of a process of self 
selection in which relatively better off individuals come to dominate and define 
project activities (often at the expense of the poorest or in terms of gender equity; 
Chaiken 1990; Mwaniki 1986). Similarly, programs that assist "vulnerable" 
people tend to misperceive the nature of vulnerability and, at best, only help some 
individuals meet their immediate survival needs while failing to address the root 
cause of poverty (Udvardy 1998). 
Despite such diverse approaches, there was little evidence in 1994 that NGOs 
were able to identify, much less alleviate, rural or urban poverty. Indeed, they 
were just beginning to move away from projects focused on service delivery, 
and the elimination of poverty, as a specific issue, was yet to surface. NGOs 
were greatly concerned with the poor policy environment and with structural 
adjustment, both of which were undermining the education and health sector; 
most NGOs experienced ifficulty in securing donor funding partly in light 
of the rapid growth of the sector and because donors "cherry-picked" specific 
NGOs or particular NGO projects. To make matters worse, INGOs pursued a 
self-interested strategy in selecting a local NGO as their "partner." Tellingly, the 
deep-seated hostility most NGOs felt toward the government was extended to the 
World Bank."5 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE LATE 1990s 
Between 1994 and 1999 the political and policy environment in Kenya deteriorated. 
Structural adjustment led to a further erosion of basic services and to rising 
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poverty: the number of poor increased from an estimated 11.5 million in 1995 to 
12.5 million in 1997, which meant that 53% of rural and 49% of urban households 
were living below the poverty line (United Nations Development Program [UNDP] 
2003:4). The government had also failed to implement policy reforms, including 
the DFRD, which meant that local development was nonexistent. 
Rising corruption and continuing political problems led donors to establish 
a number of informal fora to exchange information and monitor the political 
situation. They included UNDP-coordinated meetings which examined possible 
ways of "leveraging issues with the Government of Kenya" (e.g., to push the 
poverty agenda),16 the Like-Minded Donors Group, various World Bank 
convened Sector Discussion Groups, and the Economic Governance Group or 
EGG. This latter forum, chaired by The Netherlands and attended by bilateral and 
multilateral gencies, monitored corruption a d the government's implementation 
of structural djustment policies (without which donors threatened to withdraw 
their funding). By mid-1998 the EGG was also attempting to agree to a set of 
standards for funding NGOs,17 though progress toward this objective was slow 
because bilateral agencies "lacked a strategic view of the sector and of rights and 
democracy issues"'18 and/or because aid programs were defined by their respective 
embassies (i.e., by foreign-policy onsiderations 
Bythe late 1990s the government ofKenya 
had relaxed controls over the registration f
NGOs, which led to a proliferation of small, 
poorly organized and funded, and woefully 
ambitious organizations. The areas that saw 
the most rapid growth were related to work 
with pastoralists, health (notably HIV/AIDS), 
gender, and natural resources. 
The vast majority of registered NGOs 
were based in Nairobi and/or central Kenya. 
This geographic lustering isunderlined by the 
fact that only 60 to 100 organizations, many 
of which were Christian churches, operated 
in the 15 poorest rural districts (Table 3). In 
short, very few NGOs were geographically 
positioned to address rural poverty directly. 
Interestingly, NGO expansion in the 1990s 
does not appear to have resulted from 
access to international funding (though the 
expectation of funding may have been a factor 
in the establishment of such organizations; 
Kanyinga 1993). 
By the late 1990s INGOs recognized 
that their "partners"-small NGOs and 
community-based groups-lacked the ability 
to undertake their stated objectives, which led 
to the development of "capacity-building"'9 
TABLE 3 
NGOs operating in the 15 
poorest districts in Kenya, 1998 
District Number 
of NGOs 
Marsabit 4 
Samburu 4 
Isiolo 3 
Makueni 4 
Turkana 8 
Tana River 3 
Machakos 8 
Mandera 2 
Kilifi 3 
Embu 3 
Kericho 3 
Busia 7 
Bungoma 6 
Vihiga 6 
Nyamira 2 
Wajir 3 
Data provided by NGO Council 
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programs aimed at providing organizational development training to local NGOs 
and community groups. While bilateral agencies bemoaned the seemingly endless 
drain on their resources represented by such programs, they nevertheless funded 
capacity-building as one activity by which to attain their wider strategic interests 
(see Gould 2006). Thus the stated aim of British support for NGO capacity 
building was "strengthening structures with a focus on poverty" and "shifting 
responsibility [for development work] to community organisations" (Thom 
1997:27). British assistance focused on assisting NGOs to develop the "capacity 
to identify, support, administer and monitor programmes" capable of reducing 
poverty rather than merely addressing the symptoms of poverty (Holloway 
1998:26). 
In the mid- 1990s DFID financed the British NGO Action-Aid Kenya (AAK) to 
create a capacity-building program for local NGOs. The principal objective of this 
program from AAK's point of view was to move beyond its "inherent weakness" 
as a "foreign agency" to expand its mandate for advocacy by increasing the spread 
of NGOs and creating a network capable of influencing national policy (Action 
Aid Kenya 1993:47). British funding provided the means to realize this ambition 
while at the same time it allowed DFID to define "standards of good practice" 
in the sector (i.e., by instituting participatory capacity assessments, financial 
management systems, improving NGO governance and program planning; Muir 
and Riak 1998). The first phase of the project provided assistance to 56 NGOs/ 
community-based organizations (CBOs). Although subsequent evaluation showed 
little evidence that the assisted organizations had reduced poverty, there was 
considerable evidence that the program had created a demand for "empowerment" 
(i.e., further assistance). By funding capacity building, DFID created a dendritic 
network of influence involving itself, an intermediary (British) INGO, and local 
NGOs and CBOs.20 Though local organizations were poorly positioned to deliver 
development assistance, their real value lay in communicating and elaborating the 
tenets of neoliberal economic discourse and political reform to ordinary citizens. 
Significantly, a small number of left-leaning advocacy and social 
mobilization NGOs developed in the mid- to late 1990s, including some second 
generation NGOs that grew out of community networks (as distinct from those 
that grew out of NGO offices; e.g., Kituo cha Sheria). Although development 
NGOs had little access to donor funding, bilateral agencies did provide support 
for "rights-based" activities and for short-term projects focused on the 1997 
national elections.2' The US supported 15 rights-based organizations,22 while 
Scandinavian countries supported a smaller number of organizations with whom 
they had a long-term relationship, and the German trade union Frederick Ebert 
Stiftung provided limited funding. Britain played a marginal role because its 
funding criteria were too conservative and its bureaucracy too inflexible to meet 
the needs of "rights-based" NGOs. In any event, the length of time required 
to strengthen the organizational capacity of networks and educate community 
members about their rights meant that these initiatives were unable to absorb 
significant levels of funding. 
As we have seen, though bilateral agencies espoused the need to widen 
opportunities for citizen "participation," they provided limited support for 
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.022 on September 17, 2019 03:46:26 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
BILATERAL AID TO KENYA IN THE 1990s 259 
"rights-based work" and focused instead on cyclical forms of support for "civic 
education" campaigns and election monitoring activities. At the same time, donor 
support for civic education was relatively new. Many of the programs suffered 
from the same deficiencies, namely: (a) all were based in Nairobi and run by 
lawyers; (b) nearly all had very poor linkages to the rural population; (c) they had 
not given adequate consideration to defining their entry point into communities; 
(d) they had not developed an adequate strategy for "educating" citizens; and (J) 
they were unable to assess or uninterested in assessing the effectiveness of their 
strategies (Frontier Consulting 1998; Maina et al. 1997; Southall 1999). 
Moreover, the Danish, British, Swedish, and Dutch bilateral agencies made 
it a precondition of their funding that a number of organizations should merge 
for the short-term objective of monitoring the 1997 general election. Although 
this project was judged to be "generally successful" in deploying 27,000 poll 
watchers, 840 campaign monitors, and 420 count certifiers, it was unable to 
ensure "free and fair" elections. Further, the centralized form of planning imposed 
by the donors undermined future cooperation (Frontier Consulting 1998). In this 
area, as elsewhere, donors pushed their agenda onto NGOs through a combination 
of rewriting funding proposals, funding only the aspects of a program that suited 
their interests, and providing limited support for recurrent costs. Some agencies 
funded specific individuals to undertake civic education work rather than assessing 
the sector to identify appropriate organizations. Donors tended to fund the same 
organization regardless of its performance, which resulted in projects that were 
narrowly focused on the better-educated, on Christians rather than Muslims, and 
on the same ethnic groups (Frontier Consulting 1996; Maina et al. 1997). 
The volume of donor funding for NGOs and other organizations in the late 
1990s is difficult to assess. Table 4 summarizes data provided by the principal 
funding agencies for programs that were run and/or funded by their Nairobi 
offices (it excludes funding administered from abroad). Approximately ?7 million 
per year was disbursed in Nairobi between 1997 and 1999. The large number 
of grants obscures two facts: many agencies funded the same NGOs, and four 
agencies funded NGO activities (meetings, networking, training, computers) but 
not recurrent costs, programs, or projects. In short, bilateral funding was limited 
in scope, and it was distributed to a small number of organizations. 
Clearer insight into the nature of bilateral funding for NGOs and other 
organizations comes from the 1999 review of DFID's Direct Funding Initiative 
(DFI), one of six mechanisms through which DFID funds NGOs. The DFI 
began in 1994 with the objective of enhancing the "poverty focus" of British 
aid and was justified on the grounds of efficiency and the need to learn lessons 
from NGOs. However, even at the height of DFI funding in 1999, only 9% (?13 
million) of British bilateral aid was spent on fifteen NGOs; the remainder went 
to international (especially British) NGOs. The findings of the 1999 review 
illustrate the problems inherent in bilateral support for NGOs. The consultants 
who performed the review were asked to assess the appropriateness and 
coherence of the DFI within Britain's overall aid program. Key questions were 
raised as to whether the funded projects achieved their stated objectives and 
whether the DFI provided "value for money." 
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TABLE 4 
Bilateral funding to Kenyan NGOs/Civil Society Organizations in 1998 
Applications Current Program Budget 
Organization per year Grants per year 
DFID - Direct Funding Initiative 60 15 ?1 million 
DFID - Govemance ? 17 ?1.5 million 
British Council - Post Beijing Portfolio 150 11 ?300,000+ 
(funding from DFID/British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office) 
Swedish Intemational Development Agency - 15 ?365,000 
Royal Netherlands Embassy 7-10 Guilder 1.5-3 
million 
DANIDA 111 35 unknown 
USAID - Democracy and Govemance 200 15 $2.1-2.5 million 
theme over 3 yrs 
Ford Foundation - Human rights and media no no $2 million 
information information 
Canadian Intemational Development 5+ 3 $200,000 
Agency 
Total 526+ 121+ ?7 million 
Sources: various embassies in Nairobi 
The team was restricted to reviewing existing documentation, interviewing 
grant holders and aid officials, and holding a workshop with NGO "partners" to 
discuss and assess the program. The review was not participatory because the key 
issues to be evaluated-whether sustainable improvements had been achieved, 
what lessons had been learned, and whether local capacity had been created and 
was sustainable-were defined by DFID. Furthermore the team found that the 
poor quality of project documentation restricted the conclusions it could reach. 
The program was supposed to enhance DFID's ability to alleviate poyverty; 
it was not expected to develop as a discrete project but rather to act as "a funding 
and management mechanism available to all sectors in DFID Kenya." Prior to 
the establishment of the program DFID had only occasionally contracted with 
NGOs to deliver specified inputs for government projects. Indeed, DFID had little 
knowledge of participatory methods and had not embraced "participation" as a 
means of providing development assistance. 
The review found that at least half of funding for the program had been 
disbursed to British INGOs (more, if former British organizations are included) 
and that the projects were unevenly distributed among different DFID divisions. 
Projects were adjudged to have largely achieved their purposes, but crucially, "it 
was not possible . .. to assess the contribution of projects to poverty reduction" 
(Scotland, Fleming, and Campbell 1999:14). Furthermore, all but one project 
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(see below) appeared to have assisted the poor, to have provided key lessons 
for development, and to have developed the capacity of local partners. It should 
be noted that poverty reduction was not necessarily a stated objective of project 
funding, and in many cases this objective was inferred. Given these parameters it 
is instructive to look at three projects reviewed by the team. 
The project that was judged to have best met its defined purpose was Oxfam 
Wajir, a development project that evolved out of a long relationship with local 
pastoralists dating back to 1984 when Oxfam first provided emergency assistance 
to them. The development project began in 1994 with the stated aim of reducing 
poverty and vulnerability by improving self-reliance over a period of nine years. 
The project is well documented and was the only one for which an economic 
impact assessment was carried out. The assessment indicated that key components 
had been successfully implemented and that the project had brought important 
economic benefits, including a significant reduction in the vulnerability of local 
communities to drought (Oxfam 1996; Odhiambo, Holden, and Ackello-Ogutu 
1998). Oxfam created pastoral development associations which provided a range 
of vital services to local communities, including wholesaling veterinary supplies 
and providing a vehicle for collective action (e.g., to manage grazing lands, pool 
resources, and undertake development projects). However, the evaluation did 
not consider whether the benefits would survive the withdrawal of government 
support or the impact of growing regional/ethnic conflict. 
The project adjudged least successful was a primary health care project 
serving pastoralists in Turkana which, since its inception in 1990, had signally 
failed (Lyons 1998). The key difficulty arose from the organization's reliance 
on a Western medical model to provide a form of health service through a static 
health clinic run by staff who lacked the cultural sensitivity to deal with their 
patients and the competence to manage the project. Initial problems were to have 
been overcome by enhancing community participation and ownership through 
cost-sharing and by creating more appropriate forms of communication between 
staff and clients. However, eighteen years of funding had failed to establish a 
viable project. Given its history one is left to wonder why the review concluded 
that its objectives were "likely to be partially achieved" rather than seeing it as an 
outright failure. 
The Kwale Rural Support Program in an area east of Mombasa was heralded 
as a cutting-edge project whose central objective was to create social capital 
by reviving village-level institutions which established "productive physical 
infrastructure" (PPI: a water supply, a road) and provided support for rural 
livelihoods (e.g., credit, seed and fertilizer packages). The evaluation relied 
heavily on my review of the project (Campbell and Horton 1998). Owing to a 
slow start-up, the project was only in its second year of operation. Furthermore, 
the creation of appropriate and locally sustainable PPIs required a new approach 
to ensure that women and the rural poor were able to participate. 
I organized a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) in one site which indicated 
the problems facing the project. I asked Kidzuvini village committee members 
to identify indicators of wealth that reflected the reality of village life; after 
some discussion they distinguished between rich, middle-income, and poor 
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households. I then asked which wealth category they belonged to: two came from 
rich, eighteen came from middle-income, and nine individuals came from poor 
households. The economic status of the household had important implications 
for its ability to participate in and benefit from the project: while all member 
households contributed labor to build the local PPI, half of the poor households 
could not afford to participate in the savings and credit scheme (and none of the 
"rich" households chose to save with the scheme). Furthermore, the poor could 
not afford the time to attend project meetings. In short, not only were the poor 
underrepresented in the project, the project primarily served the interests ofbetter 
off households. New ways needed to be found to assist the poor to participate in 
the project. 
The review team was asked to comment on the procedures DFID used to 
assess, fund, and evaluate NGOs and to assess the extent to which lessons had 
been learned by project administrators and by DFID. Broadly speaking, the team 
found DFID's procedures to be time-consuming and overly bureaucratic; the 
procedures created tensions with "partners" by imposing heavy accountability 
requirements hat hindered rather than facilitated partnership (they also blocked 
small NGOs from accessing support). Just as seriously, DFID proved to be slow at 
disbursing agreed funds, and despite projects being "owned" by different divisions, 
disagreements between them-particularly between Social Development and 
Governance-created tensions that stymied cooperation. 
Learning from its NGO partners appeared to be a low priority for DFID. First, 
lesson-learning was not included as an aspect of project planning. Furthermore, 
no formal mechanism existed within the program, or indeed within DFID, to 
monitor and report on projects. Nevertheless project staff could visit other projects 
and, to a limited extent, access their capacity-building support. Two of the DFI 
projects employed (seconded) government s aff, which established a link to local 
government offices. 
The failure of DFID to learn from its NGO partners represents an important 
missed opportunity for several reasons. First, the difficult policy context led NGOs 
to develop innovative ways of responding to the needs of local people and to make 
the state more responsive to communities. Moreover, the projects hed significant 
light on broader development problems, ranging from coping with the Kenyan 
DFRD, transforming an emergency relief project into a successful development 
project, and learning how to reach poor people. On a broad strategic level, DFID's 
bureaucratic procedures and its conservative political views prevented it from 
supporting and learning from cutting-edge, second-generation NGOs like Kituo 
cha Sharia, which explicitly sought to link access to basic services with the 
exercise of basic political rights. 
If we return to the wider picture we find that by 1998 donors were beginning 
to collaborate in a joint initiative to enmesh the government in a process of policy 
reform by enrolling key policymakers-not elected politicians or the public-in 
a National Poverty Eradication Program located in the Office of the President. 
Donors elaborated a fiction that the program emerged from "public consultation" 
with "key stakeholders" when in fact it was written by a DFID consultant with the 
aim of establishing a charter of citizens' rights, providing better service coverage 
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to low-income groups, and elaborating a strategy for "broad-based economic 
growth" (Republic of Kenya 1998). Indeed, a sixteen-year work plan was drafted 
which set out a framework for "recruiting national energies" and creating and 
sustaining "national and local partnerships" tocombat poverty (Republic of Kenya 
1999). The attempt relied heavily on enlisting a small number of senior officials 
in the president's office and in two other ministries to join a network of (foreign) 
policymakers who would generate and implement rational development policies for 
Kenya. However, the strategy failed completely and the program became the focus 
of political patronage (Patrick, Els, and Wanyama 2005). The decade ended much 
as it had begun, with the country run by a corrupt administration which successfully 
resisted the threats and bribes of donors and demands for local accountability. 
CONCLUSION 
Ethnographic fieldwork conducted in a range of development institutions and at 
a variety of locales and levels illustrates the complex nature of aid relationships 
and policy implementation. Official rhetoric is often articulated in the form of 
normative statements which may provide a starting point from which to analyze 
the development process, but studies that begin and end with policy documents/ 
statements produce incomplete and simplistic analyses (Abrahamsen 1997; 
Ferguson 1990; Hauser 1999) of a messy and unpredictable political process. 
Rather than recognizing that individual organizations/actors may have their 
own agendas, recent anthropological work has incorporated the problematic 
assumption that a significant process of brokerage (Olivier de Sardan 2005) 
occurs at the development interface between aid organizations. This "translation" 
"invariably ensures that all actors-perhaps through strategic representations 
defer to dominant or official narratives of agency and history that work to reinstate 
policy ambitions and to conceal divergent and contradictory logics of practice" 
(Mosse and Lewis 2006:16). While this observation might be argued to hold for 
foreign aid agencies (at least in terms of how they represent their work to the 
public), it is problematic from the point of view of different divisions within an 
aid agency and with respect to the Kenyan government and various NGOs, some 
of whom "buy in" to the discourse/policy to access funding while others clearly 
propagate their own "take" on current policy. Clearly a diversity of positions with 
regard to donor development discourse is possible, as is demonstrated by the way 
in which NGOs responded to the British-funded capacity-building program. 
Furthermore, the reach of donor influence is limited geographically and by 
amount (and conditions) of funding. Perhaps a more effective constraint on donor 
initiatives concerns the small number and size of their NGO clients, not to mention 
the role played by the state and its officials (e.g., the president) in blocking or 
otherwise constraining the efforts of foreign aid agencies. For example, neither 
rights-based nor election-monitoring projects met donor objectives (though 
such projects did sustain lawyers and other staff); nor were donors successful in 
reducing corruption or assisting churches or NGOs to become effective democratic 
actors. In short, it is important not to overemphasize the power of bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies whose limitations are demonstrated by their inability to 
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.022 on September 17, 2019 03:46:26 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
264 JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
cooperate with each other and by internal tensions within their organizations. 
Finally, to the extent that research on international development embraces 
empirically based fieldwork that is multi-sited, multi-vocal, and multi-level, it can 
examine the contested nature of normative/official representations of development 
against an inherently messy and unpredictable political process. 
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1. The following acronyms are used in this paper: AAK (Action-Aid Kenya); CBOs 
(community-based organizations); DANIDA (Danish International Development Agency); 
DFID (United Kingdom Department for Intemational Development); DFI (Direct Funding 
Initiative, funded by DFID); EGG (Economic Govemance Group); DFRD (District Focus 
for Rural Development); INGO (International Non-Govemmental Organization); KANU 
(Kenyan African National Union); NCCK (National Christian Council of Kenya); NGOs 
(Non-Governmental Organizations); OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development); PPI (Productive Physical Infrastructure); PRA (Participatory Rural 
Appraisal); PRSPs (Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs); SWAPs (Sector-Wide 
Approaches); SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency); USAID (United States 
Agency for Intemational Development). 
2. See the essays in WorldDevelopment 15 (1987 supplement) and Drabek's summary 
of the key arguments (1987). 
3. On the nature of civil society in Africa see Azarya (1994) and Callaghy (1994); see 
Campbell (2001) for a discussion of civil society and NGOs in Ethiopia. 
4. A significant contributor to this strand of research originated from organizations 
which promoted better NGO management, planning, and evaluation via specialized training 
programs, such as INTRAC <http://www.intrac.org/>. 
5. See Cooke and Kothari 2001; Botchway 2001. The principal exception has been the 
work of David Mosse (2001, 2005a, 2005b). 
6. In urban areas more than 16,000 individuals were forced out by the police and 
bulldozers (Mungano wa Wanavijiji 1997). 
7. The objectives of British policy in the early 1990s was to promote economic 
liberalization, enhance productive capacity, and encourage good govemment (see United 
Kingdom 1993). While the 1997 White Paper argued the case for a human-rights perspective 
in development, it continued to promote neoliberal policy reform (UK 1997). 
8. Information on bilateral programs comes from the OECD <http://www.oecd. 
org/>. 
9. Data come from interviews and documentation with UK DFID, USAID, the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy, DANIDA, SIDA, Canadian International Development Agency, the 
World Bank, the British Council, and the Ford Foundation. 
10. The level of assistance varied tremendously: USAID channeled about 30% of its 
aid via American NGOs, The Netherlands channeled 10% of its aid through NGOs, and 
13% of Danish aid went to NGOs. Data from OECD evaluations of bilateral programs. 
11. For instance, the American embassy has been critical of the Kenyan govemment 
and has, from the late 1 980s, funded NGOs as a means of bypassing the Kenyan govemment 
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to pursue its own policy objectives (Heam 2002). 
12. Cooperation began to occur with the development of Sector-Wide Approaches 
(SWAPS) and the use of Poverty Reduction Strategy Programs (PRSPs), which provided 
a shared modality for pushing policy objectives and reforms in Kenya and elsewhere in 
Africa (Norton and Bird 1998; Bretton Woods Project 2003). 
13. However, successful entrepreneurs tended to hire family members and not the 
unskilled or unemployed. 
14. Interview with Mr. Solomon Mwangi, Appropriate Technologies for Enterprise 
Creation, 3 February 1994. 
15. Interview with Ms. Karen Twining, director, Oxfam UK, 24 January 1994. 
16. Their views were reflected in my report to the World Bank but were cut from the 
final report. 
17. Mr. M. Mallalieu, Kenya Program Manager (DFID) and First Secretary of the 
High Commission, interviewed 26 June 1998. 
18. Information, and the following quote, from an interview ith Mr. N. Braakhuis, 
Counselor, Royal Netherlands Embassy, 7 July 1998. 
19. "Capacity-building" has multiple meanings and may be delivered via quite 
different modalities. The extent to which capacity building actually enhances program 
delivery and organizational development is intensely debated. 
20. The absence of a long-term and/or mutually agreed commitment to support NGOs 
makes it clear that DFID's support was narrowly defined to suit its own interests rather 
than the needs of a diverse and poorly organized sector. 
21. Information comes from interviews with Ms. Jane Weru of Kituo cha Sharia (6 
July 1998) and Ms. Helena Kithinji, an independent consultant/researcher (29 June 1998). 
22. Interview with Mr. D. Weller, USAID (3 July 1998). 
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